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INTRODUCTION.
Mozambican civil society organisations (CSOs), backed by foreign civil society counterparts from 
Brazil and Japan mainly, have become highly critical of ProSavana, the trilateral 
Brazilian-Japanese-Mozambican agricultural development programme. It is perhaps Brazil’s and 
Japan’s most ambitious and headline-catching initiative in the recent history of their international 
cooperation on African development projects. e success of Prodecer, a Japanese-Brazilian 
development partnership, in transforming Brazil’s tropical savannah (known as the cerrado) into one 
of the world’s most agriculturally productive regions inspired ProSavana in Mozambique.1 
ProSavana’s promoters view the situation dierently from the CSOs. Proponents describe the 
programme as a way to revolutionise agriculture in Mozambique by transforming the Nacala 
Corridor in the north into a highly productive agricultural zone that will denitively address food 
security issues. Mozambican CSOs, by contrast, claim that this programme will mainly benet 
Brazilian and Japanese capital, as well as the Mozambican elite, while marginalising local small 
farmers. ese groups predict that ProSavana will instigate land grabs by foreign companies and 
migrant farmers, leading to a rural exodus – the same problems created by Prodecer in Brazil.2 As a 
result, the CSOs decry the programme as Japanese and Brazilian “neo-imperialism” and 
“neo-colonialism” (ADECRU 2014). Accordingly, Mozambican CSOs have undertaken an intense 
campaign to persuade the three governments to suspend, rethink and reformulate the programme, 
giving more attention to small farmers and providing more information and transparency. 
 
is article aims to analyse and explain the reasons behind the CSOs’ strong criticism of the 
ProSavana programme. is will contribute toward: (1) understanding the role of Mozambican 
CSOs as actors regulating international development cooperation projects; (2) revealing the political 
and economic interests behind ProSavana, as a rst step toward a more critical approach to trilateral 
cooperation; and (3) illustrating through this case how a partnership between Brazil and 
“traditional” donors actually works. 
Firstly, we will analyse the cooperation policies of Brazil and Japan in Mozambique, taking into 
account its evolution, actors, mechanisms and motives. Secondly, we will introduce ProSavana, 
examining the narratives and roles of Japan and Brazil in this programme. irdly, we will consider 
the engagement of CSOs from the three countries, their role in exerting a political check on the 
Brazilian and Japanese governments, investors, and companies, as well as their narratives and 
mechanisms of protest. 
MOZAMBIQUE: THE FIRST AFRICAN-BRAZILIAN SUCCESS? 
Brazil’s interest in international development skyrocketed during the mandate of President Luis 
Inácio Lula Da Silva (2003-2010). Da Silva’s Administration had a special interest in strengthening 
1. For more details about Prodecer see: http://www.campo.com.br/proceder/?lang=es 
2. Prodecer is described as a State-led colonisation programme that has promoted land ownership in Brazil to become more 
concentrated and more foreign (Clements & Fernandes 2012).
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relations with the Southern hemisphere, as evidenced by the attention given to Brazil’s immediate 
neighbours (South America; Mercosul) and its active participation in “Global South” arenas such as 
the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP),3 the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) 
Forum, BRICS, Africa and South America Summit (ASA),4 and the South Atlantic (Alves 2013). 
African countries have been a central part of recent Brazilian foreign policy (Stolte 2012; White 
2010; World Bank & IPEA 2011), which has fostered Brazil-Africa political and economic relations. 
President Lula visited the continent on twelve occasions and opened seventeen embassies in African 
nations during his Administration.5 In addition to this diplomatic activism, there was an important 
increase in the implementation of technical cooperation projects under the rubric of South-South 
Cooperation (SSC), which shares and transfers national capacities and knowledge in areas of 
Brazilian expertise like agriculture, health, and social policy (IPEA 2013). As a result of this 
expansion of foreign relations, trade between Brazil and African nations increased from US$4 billion 
to US$20 billion in the same timeframe. e Brazilian National Economic and Social Development 
Bank (BNDES in the Portuguese acronym) set up incentives for Brazilian companies to invest in 
Africa (World Bank & IPEA 2011). Continued investment via development programmes like 
ProSavana seems likely in the long-run, given recent developments in Brazil-Africa economic and 
political relationship.
In this context of rising Brazilian investment in African nations’ relations with Mozambique went 
from mutual ignorance to close economic and diplomatic cooperation. Today the African country is 
chief among Brazil’s partners in Africa. For example, Brazilian-Mozambican trade has increased 
considerably, reaching US$146 million in 2012 (CCBM 2013). More importantly, Brazilian 
economic groups now operate in Mozambique, the best known example being Vale do Rio Doce’s 
concession to exploit the Moatize coal mine (the biggest in the country), but also construction rms 
like Oderbrecht and Camargo Correa. 
Table 1. Brazilian Companies in Mozambique
3. e CPLP is multilateral forum created in 1996 to deepen cooperation and consists of Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tomé and Principe, East Timor, and Equatorial Guinea.
4.e Africa-South America Summit is a diplomatic conference rst organised in 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria followed by the second 
summit in 2009 in Margarita Island, Venezuela and in 2013 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea.
5.  Under Lula Brazil opened embassies in Ethiopia, Sudan, Benin, Tanzania, Cameroon, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, São 
Tome and Principe, Botswana, and Zambia, in addition to a consulate in Nigeria. 
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Oderbrecht SA - Moatize Project: an infrastructure project to develop the Moatize coal mine, which 
includes building roads, constructing civil works and creating a processing plant for 
coal. e project provides for the rehabilitation of railways, the expansion of the port of 
Beira, and the construction of a thermoelectric plant.
- e Nacala Air Base in Nampula province, to be transformed into an international airport.   
Company Project   
Vale do Rio Doce - Moatize Coal Mine: investment of US$1.7 million.
- Evate Project: a project for the extraction of phosphate rock. 
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Source: Estadão (2011), Almeida, L. & S. Kraychete (2012), and information from Mozambican company websites, and journals. 
Regardless of these numbers and examples, the intensication of ties between Brazil and 
Mozambique has been mostly driven by the intensication of presidential diplomacy, and marked 
by the promotion of cooperation programmes like the Fiocruz factory producing anti-retroviral 
drugs in Maputo or the ProSavana programme developing the Nacala Corridor’s agriculture 
potential. 
Since Dilma Rousse’s election in 2011, however, Brazil has not sustained the same level of relations 
with African nations as before (Fingermann 2014).6 As a result of the economic slowdown, 
Brazil-Africa trade has signicantly decreased since 2011. Brazil’s exports in particular dropped from 
US$12.2 billion in 2011 to US$9.7 billion in 2014, whereas its imports maintained an ascending 
trend, which has resulted in a greater decit for Brazil. 
In tandem with the government, Brazilian companies have also decreased foreign direct investment 
in the African region (Mello 2015). Although most companies are privately owned — only in some 
cases, like Vale and Petrobras, does the government hold a stake — the government’s sentiment 
impacts directly on their degree of internationalisation, as most Brazilian companies rely on credit 
facilities provided by the BNDES and Banco do Brasil to nance their investments overseas. Hence 
Dilma Rousse´s reticent foreign policy in Africa probably inuenced indirectly the disinvestments 
of Vale and Petrobras. Mello also points out that Vale recently closed its operations in three African 
countries and sold a stake in its operations to Mitsui in Mozambique, while Petrobras returned ve 
oil exploration blocks in Namibia, Angola, Tanzania and Libya in 2013 and 2014.7 Dilma’s 
retrenchment has also restrained the investments in ProSavana – Brazil’s largest Trilateral 
Development Cooperation agreement – of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency8 (ABC in Portuguese), 
as ABC has not been able to begin building the requisite laboratory in Lichinga. Equally, the CENAI 
Centre has ceased functioning due to the dearth of nance.9 
6. is change, likely the result of slowing economic growth in Brazil, does not only aect African nations. Brazil’s economic 
slowdown aected the South-South cooperation agenda as well as the other political and commercial relations.
7.  e case of Vale is also motivated by the fall of coal price in the international market. In the case particular of Mozambique it 
can also pointed out the poor transport infrastructure.
8.  Brazil’s federal government established ABC in 1987, linking it to the Ministry of External Aairs. ABC’s mission is to plan, 
coordinate and execute Brazil’s international cooperative ventures, both those received and those oered. 
9. is Centre was established in Mozambique by Lula da Silva when he visited the country in 2009 and has the aim of forming 
and training labour in reforestation and prison work. 
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Camargo Correa - Mphanda Nkuwa Hydroelectric Power Station: the construction of the hydroelectric 
power station on the Zambezi River between Tete and Cahora Bassa, in partnership 
with the Mozambican companies Electricidade de Moçambique and INSITEC. 
Andrade Gutierrez - Road construction in Cabo Delgado Province (northern Mozambique); construction 
of Moamba Major Dam in Maputo province (southern Mozambique) 
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e year 2015 so far has seen a change in Brazil’s political and economic interests in Mozambique 
under Dilma. e March-April 2015 tour of four African countries (Ghana, Mozambique, Sao 
Tome and Angola) by Mauro Vieira, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Aairs, and Armando de 
Queiroz Monteiro Neto, the Minister of Development, Industry and Commerce, shows that even 
with the internal crisis and economic slowdown, Brazil is still committed to African development 
(Sul21 2015). During this tour, Mozambican and Brazilian ocials signed four important 
agreements to: 1) promote partnerships between businessmen from both countries through facilities 
expediting the requisite visas; 2) nalise undertakings concerning renewable energy; 3) promote 
investment by foreign ventures; and 4) expand trade, investment and technical cooperation (Voz da 
America 2015).10 
e re-set of Brazil-Africa relations represents a shift toward an increased importance given to 
international aairs in Dilma Rousse’s second term, but with a more commercial approach. In the 
words of Brazil’s Foreign Aairs Minister, “e valuable symbolism of our presence cannot replace 
diplomacy results – results that are measured with numbers, are obtained with awareness of the 
mission, with action, through engagement, with means, in short” (Sul21 2015). is perception 
corresponds with the conclusion of Leite et al. (2014) that the Rousse Administration has taken a 
more pragmatic approach to South-South relations, giving more importance to commercial relations 
and investment. 
BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: INSTRUMENTS AND NARRATIVES.
e Brazilian government does not consider growing investment lending by the BNDES, debt relief, 
and concessional lending as instruments of developmental cooperation. Brazil’s denition of 
“cooperation” comprises technical, educational, scientic and humanitarian cooperation; refugee 
protection; and contributions to international and regional multilateral organisations (IPEA 2013). 
Cooperation stems from Brazil’s foreign policy priorities; hence diplomacy is the point of entry for 
the establishment of cooperative relations, where the Presidency’s guidelines play a key role. e 
Brazilian government often resorts to SSC as an instrument for maintaining and fostering economic 
and political relations with strategic partners (Leite et al. 2014), Mozambique being no exception. 
In fact, the forging of cooperative alliances with Mozambique has been interlinked with the 
intensication of diplomatic and economic relations. e scal resources allocated to Mozambique 
for the sake of cooperation totalled US$32,000,783 in 2011, of which US$22,157,013 went to 
bilateral cooperation and US$9,843,770 to trilateral cooperation (ABC 2014). 
Within these mechanisms, technical cooperation takes the spotlight among development 
cooperation initiatives. Even though technical cooperation only represents 6% of the overall 
cooperative budget of US$923 million in 2010 (IPEA 2013), this aspect of Brazilian development 
10. e Brazil-Mozambique Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (Acordo Brasil-Moçambique de 
Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos - ACFI), the rst agreement to be signed based on Itamaraty’s new investment 
agreement model created together with the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce and the Ministry of Finance, 
stands out as the most important of these new deals.
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eort enjoys important visibility. Technical cooperation may be dened as any activity designed to 
develop human resources and capacities through the transfer of knowledge and technical knowhow, 
without direct nancial transfer (Cabral 2011). 
e importance of technical cooperation in Brazilian development policy may be explained by two 
factors. Firstly, it consists of knowledge transfer, which is cost-ecient and so relevant for other 
developing countries. Secondly, the principles and content of technical cooperation reect Brazil’s 
foreign policy narratives. e ocial discourse behind SSC and technical cooperation is based on 
the following principles:  (1) horizontality, (2) non-conditionality and demand-drivenness, and (3) 
the sharing of Brazil’s knowledge and best practices about ghting poverty with other developing 
countries. ese guiding principles are aligned with Brazil’s foreign policy principles, such as 
autonomy and non-intervention (Leite et al. 2014; Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007). Indeed, the 
technical cooperation oered by Brazil is based on its own development experience and its 
technology and public policies, which are perceived and portrayed as more relevant to developing 
countries, especially those located in the tropics, too, and sharing similar ecological circumstances. 
e idea is that “what is good for Brazil is good for Africa”. As Lula da Silva once said, “I am 
convinced that the public policies implemented in Brazil can be exported to Africa. ere will need 
to be some adjustments of course, but these policies can work in Africa” (Instituto Lula 2013). is 
enhances Brazil’s narrative and self-image as a “development partner” rather than a “donor” 
(Dauvergne & Farias 2012).  
Brazil’s technical cooperation further illustrates the shift in Rousse’s approach to Africa noted 
above; for example, in 2012 and 2013 ABC’s budget for technical cooperation fell to BRL3 million, 
from BRL52 million in 2011 (Leite et. al. 2014). Moreover, Rousse has scaled down the rhetoric 
and grand announcements concerning new Brazil-to-Africa technical cooperation undertakings. For 
example, the few announcements made during her rst year consisted of plans to revise development 
cooperation agreements left over from Lula’s years which had not been fully implemented 
(Hochstetler 2013). 
e legal framework of Brazil’s international development cooperation constrains its eective 
deployment. Brazilian law prohibits the allocation of national resources abroad for the benet of a 
third country, that is, for cooperative purposes. In order to implement technical cooperation 
programmes and initiatives, ABC had to make arrangements with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) (Cabral & Weinstock 2010). is was going on throughout Lula’s 
administration, but since Rousse came in, there have not been any changes made to strengthen 
ABC’s capacity or to reform the legal framework. 
Dilma nevertheless made two big announcements in 2013 concerning the future of Brazil’s 
development cooperation: 1) a new agency of cooperation, trade and investments for Africa and 
Latin America, which she announced at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the African Union 
(Suyama 2014) – in her words, “It’s a funding agency; but it is also a business agency; it is an agency 
to facilitate investment” (Brazil Africa 2013); –,and 2) a White Paper on Brazil’s foreign policy, 
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which Rousse asked the new Foreign Aairs Minister, Luis Alberto Figueiredo, to lead. Although 
the rst proposal has not taken o yet, it’s clear that Brazil’s development cooperation stands at an 
important juncture, where the logic of cooperation based on solidarity and that of private 
investment seems to have converged, as exemplied by the ProSavana programme. 
Another key aspect of Brazilian technical cooperation is its enhancement of alliances with member 
states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and with 
multilateral agencies, through triangular development-cooperation partnerships.11 In fact, as noted 
by Abdenur, “engagement in triangular cooperation has served to further the Brazilian government’s 
broader goal of consolidating Brazil’s position as a ‘pivotal’ Southern state in the international arena” 
(2007). Cooperation alliances with Northern or traditional partners is not seen as contradictory 
with SSC principles and logics; indeed. As expressed in ABC’s position on trilateral cooperation, 
“Although bilateral cooperation is a priority in its foreign policy, the Brazilian Government believes 
that such partnerships constitute a triangular sum of eorts that adds value to the specic and 
complementary initiatives undertaken by bilateral channels of South-South cooperation. 
Triangulation is thus understood as a type of Brazilian South-South cooperation” (ABC 2014a). 
As at 2014, Brazil has developed TDC with Japan, Germany, the United States, Italy, Australia, the 
United Kingdom and France; and previously had worked out triangular cooperation agreements 
with Spain and Canada (Itamaraty 2014).  In 2007 ABC counted nineteen triangular cooperation 
projects in eect (Itamaraty 2007), and by 2011 there were 31 triangular cooperation projects in 
dierent phases of negotiation and implementation (Ayllon 2013). e most common sectors of 
intervention were public health, education and agriculture. e Brazilian government deploys 
discourse similar to its technical cooperation programme ideology in justifying triangular 
cooperation, viz. altruism; pragmatism – (the association with a Northern donor or multilateral 
agency is perceived as a way to expand the impacts of the transfer of the Brazilian stock of knowledge 
and public policies); – cultural ties, for example with the Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries; and the strengthening of relations with key partners (Abdenur 2007). 
Mozambique is a typical case, and an important number of triangular cooperation projects, such as 
the ProSavana programme, have been or are in process of being implemented there with the 
engagement of Brazil. Indeed, this programme has aroused important criticism, which inquires into 
strategic economic and political issues as exhibiting the country’s real motives, e.g. Brazil’s claim for 
a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (Lima & Hirst 2006; Vigevani & 
Cepaluni 2007); its eorts to disseminate globally the production of biofuels which it is 
best-positioned to supply; its goal of creating markets for Brazilian agricultural technology, inputs, 
11. Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC) is characterised by partnership with a third party, a “traditional” donor 
(member of the OECD or a multilateral agency) with a pivotal country from the global South, to work with a beneciary 
country (Mawdsley & McEwan 2012). is type of arrangement is not new in the development-cooperation landscape; 
nevertheless, its impressive expansion in the last few years is quite new. In the academic and policy-briengs literature, the terms 
trilateral and triangular are often used synonymously. 
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machinery and equipment (Ayllon & Leite 2010); and the land-grabbing ambitions of Brazilian 
agroindustry (Clements & Fernandes 2012). 
Traditional donors and emergent development partners have geostrategic, commercial and political 
interests of their own which are mobilised via international cooperation, although apolitical 
humanitarian development aid can be genuine motives too, among the complex, diverse interests 
qualifying development cooperation (Lumsdaine 1993; Morgenthau 1962; McEwan & Mawdsley 
2012). Ocially, Brazil represents itself as a “development partner” whose technical cooperation 
consists purely of an apolitical process of knowledge transfer and technical expertise (Chichava & 
Duran 2013; Dauvergne & Farias 2012). e coherence of this “interest-free” narrative is 
questionable once we have evidenced the combination and coexistence of the dierent axes of the 
renewed Mozambique-Brazil relationship, viz. Presidential diplomacy, trade expansion, Brazilian 
foreign investment, and SSC. It would seem that in the Brazilian case at least, SSC may also 
constitute a foreign policy tool aimed at the realisation of strategic economic and political objectives, 
such as Brazil’s domestic development and international autonomy (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007). 
Discussion of economic and political cooperation is complicated by the engagement of competing 
actors in the denition of Brazilian foreign policy and development cooperation. ABC acts as a 
coordinating agency, but actual responsibility for implementation resides in other, more technical 
institutions, viz. ministries, agencies, NGOs, etc. us, divergent interests and priorities collide in 
the elaboration of Brazil’s cooperative programmes. is is illustrated by the case of ProSavana and 
how civil society is engaged in it. 
Table 2. Trilateral Projects Undertaken by Brazil in Mozambique
Working Paper No. 2. 2016.
Project Partner Country Sector
Technical project for the renewal of 
Chamanculo neighbourhood
Italy Urban development and sanitation
Project for the development of a 
national programme of school meals
USA Food security
Technical project for nutrition and 
food security (Proalimentar)
USA Agriculture
Platform for agricultural innovation 
in Mozambique
USA Agriculture
Technical assistance for the establishment 
of meteorology stations in Mozambique
Germany Science and technology
ProSavana Japan Agriculture
Conservation Agriculture France Agriculture
Food Purchase World Food Programme (WFP) Agriculture
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Source: ABC 2014. Pesquisa de Projetos. Available at:  http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/pesquisa 
JAPAN IN MOZAMBIQUE.
Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister, visited Mozambique from 11 to 13 January 2014 on an 
African trip that included Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast. e rst trip to Africa by a Japanese Prime 
Minister since 2006, it marked the commencement of closer, more strategic cooperative and trade 
relations with the African continent. According to the Japanese, the main objective of the tour was 
to cultivate strategic partners for Japanese companies doing business in infrastructure and resource 
development. Representatives of 34 companies accompanied the Prime Minister (Kawate 2014). 
ey chose Mozambique because of the country’s strategic geographic situation, the importance of 
the current projects under development, and the country’s natural gas and mining development 
potential (Le Bec 2014). is was the most important ocial Japanese visit to Mozambique since 
1977, when the two countries rst established diplomatic relations. Before that, a State Secretary for 
Foreign Aairs had been the highest-ranking Japanese ocial to have visited Mozambique. On the 
trip in question, Shinzo Abe promised inter alia ¥70 billion (equivalent to US$683 million) over a 
period of ve years for development of the Nacala Corridor, the area covered by the ProSavana 
programme. 
Japanese and Mozambican representatives also brokered a loan agreement in which Japan was to 
provide an Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) loan of up to ¥17.269 billion for the Maputo 
Gas-Fired, Combined-Cycle Power Plant Development Project. e ODA loan is repayable over 40 
years (JICA 2014).12 On the same trip Abe promised funding to support the training of 300 
Mozambicans to dierent specialisms. A Japan-Mozambique Investment Forum was held in 
Maputo with the participation of Mozambican public and private companies. At this event the two 
governments signed six cooperative agreements, amongst which the most notable were two between 
the Mozambican state company Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) and, respectively, 
Chiyoda Corp. and Mitsui Corp., to train engineers and to undertake a study of liqueed natural 
gas. Petromoc, the state oil company, also signed an agreement with Marubeni Corp. for a project to 
transform methanol into diesel fuel. At the same time, Abe armed the interest of Japanese 
companies in Mozambican oil, gas and coal.
In fact, Japanese companies had already started to invest in Mozambican oil, gas and coal prior to 
the ocial visit; for example, in 2008 Mitsui & Co. acquired a 20% interest from Anadarko in the 
Mozambique Oshore Area 1 exploration block (Mitsui & Co. n/d). More recently, in 2013 INPEX 
Corporation acquired a 25% interest from Statoil ASA to explore oil and gas in Areas 2 and 5 of 
Mozambique’s continental shelf. Alongside these two Japanese companies, other prominent 
12.  According to JICA, “Japanese ODA loans (also called Yen Loans) are long-term, low interest-rate loans advanced to the 
developing countries and have the liability of being paid back” (JICA n/d).
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investors include Tullow Mozambique Ltd. with a 25% interest, and the Mozambican public 
company Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos with a 10% interest (Inpex Corporation 2013). 
Since 2013, Japanese companies like Nippon Steel, Sumitomo Metal Corp., and Nippon Steel 
Trading Company have been exploring one of Mozambique’s most important coal reserves, the 
Revuboe coal mine in Tete province, with the aim of eventually producing 5 million tonnes of 
coking coal per year (Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal 2013). In what represents a convergence of 
interests of Japanese and Brazilian companies, Japan’s Mitsui and Brazil’s Vale have set up ACWA 
Power-Moatize Termoeléctrica (APMT), a consortium to produce electricity from coal in the same 
province of Tete, an investment worth US$1 billion. e other partners are Mozambique’s 
Electricidade de Moçambique and Whatana (CPI n/d). 
Bilaterally, Japan aids Mozambique via the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 
various sectors, but mainly in the Nacala Corridor, where the ProSavana programme is to be 
implemented. Agricultural improvements and infrastructure are the main priorities. In partnership 
with the Special Economic Zone Oce (GAZEDA), JICA launched the Nacala Corridor Economic 
Development Strategies Project in June 2012 with the objective of “formulating appropriate 
strategies to guide development and stimulate investment in the Nacala Corridor” (GAZEDA 
2012). In June 2013, in the rst agreement ever signed by Japan with any Sub-Saharan country, the 
two countries assented to the reciprocal liberalisation, promotion and protection of investment. 
Japan expects the agreement will facilitate Japanese companies’ investment in coal and natural gas 
(MOFA 2013). 
It is important to note that ProSavana is not JICA’s only trilateral initiative in Mozambique. e 
Project for Improvement of Techniques for Increasing Rice Cultivation Productivity in Nante, a 
district of Maganja da Costa in Zambezia Province, also involves Vietnam (see Table 3). Japan 
believes that SSC will achieve more if it is done through triangular cooperation, which it has been 
encouraging (Honda 2013).
Table 3. JICA Major Projects in Mozambique (2007-2013)
Project Province Period
Project for improving the research 
capacity of agriculture development 
project in the Nacala Corridor 
Nampula, Niassa April 2014-March 2016
Support for an Agricultural 
Development Master Plan for 
Nacala Corridor
Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia February 2012-February 2014
Project for the establishment of 
development models at community 
level for agricultural development in 
the Nacala Corridor 
February 2012-February 2014
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Project for improving the research 
capacity of agriculture development 
project in the Nacala Corridor 
Nampula, Niassa April 2014-March 2016
Support for an Agricultural 
Development Master Plan for 
Nacala Corridor
Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia February 2012-February 2014
Project for promoting sustainability 
in rural water supply, hygiene and 
sanitation
Niassa March 2013-February 2017
Project for rice productivity 
improvement in the Chokwe 
Irrigation Scheme
Gaza February 2012-October 2014
Project for Nacala Corridor 
Economic Development Strategies
Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia, Tete, 
Cabo Delgado
April 2012-May 2014
Project for construction of bridges 
along the Ile-Cuamba highway
February 2012
Project for improvement of Nacala Port Nampula March 2012-August 2015
Nacala Port Development Project Nampula March 2013
Project for the construction of 
secondary schools 
Nampula August 2012
Project for urgent rehabilitation of 
Nacala Port
Nampula December 2012
Project for the Improvement of Techniques 
for Increasing Rice Cultivation
Zambezia January 2011-January 2015
Project for enhancement of the 
capacity for destination marketing  
and promotion by strengthening the 
linkage among tourism-related 
organisations
Maputo city; Inhambane March 2012-March 2015
Project for strengthening capacities 
of NPCS for HIV responses
Gaza March 2013-March 2015
Sustainable production from 
Jatropha in Mozambique
July 2011-June 2016
Project for the capacity development 
of road maintenance in Mozambique
August 2011-July 2014
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Source: JICA (2013a)
NARRATIVES OF JAPAN’S ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA.
Consistent Japanese engagement with Africa can be traced back to the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD), rst organised in Tokyo in 1993 and reprised every 
ve years since. TICAD is the platform used by Japan to formally consult African leaders about their 
development needs. Since 1993 four more TICAD meetings have taken place, the last in 2013. 
Today, Japan has thirty-four JICA oces on the African Continent, and is undoubtedly an 
established donor. 
Like Brazil, Japan denes itself as one of Africa’s “true partners” and frames its engagement in Africa 
as a way to facilitate economic development. Also like Brazil, Japan seeks to export its own successful 
cultural and political “experiences” to Africa. According to the Prime Minister, successful 
development will only be possible through assimilation to the Japanese culture of hard work, tidiness 
and self-discipline, which may be transmitted by Japanese companies to Africans. is model is 
known as kaizen (“correction [of errors]”), a business culture and managerial philosophy that values 
the creativity and ingenuity of each individual worker, and promotes quality and productivity 
improvement. According to the Japanese Prime Minister, the kaizen philosophy is applicable to any 
country or any culture, and it was thanks to this philosophy that Japan achieved its own 
development (Abe 2014). Another approach to development which Japan intends to share with 
Africans is the “Community Road Empowerment” (CORE) concept. As the name suggests, the 
community is involved, mainly in rural areas, in road development and maintenance, utilising a 
sustainable technology called “Do-nou [sandbag] technology”. Arguing that in many rural areas in 
Africa the poor state of road networks is one of the reasons for poverty, Japan encouraged Africans 
Project for the promotion of 
Sustainable 3R activities
Maputo February 2013-February 2017
Project for development of local 
industry through OVOP movement 
Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, 
Nampula, Manica
November 2013-January 2017
Project for a comprehensive Urban 
Transport Master Plan for the 
greater Maputo area
Maputo city, Matola city January 2012-March 2014
Project for strengthening 
pedagogical and technical skills of 
teachers in health training institutes
January 2012-December 2015
Project for the establishment of sustainable 
forest resources and an information 
platform for monitoring REDD+
February 2013-February 2018
Maputo Fish Market Project Maputo city February 2012
Montepuez-Lichinga Road Project Niassa, Cabo Delgado March 2007
Nampula-Cuamba Road upgrading Nampula, Niassa March 2010
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to adopt this technology which makes the local populations the main actors. e concept has been 
implemented in some African countries, like Kenya. In short, Japan is like Brazil in laying emphasis 
on putting its own development experience to work in Africa. e kaizen system, rst introduced in 
2009, has become very popular in Ethiopia, where the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute (EKI), the rst of 
its kind, was founded in 2011. Since then the strategy has been introduced in Kenya, Ghana, 
Zambia and Tanzania (JICA 2013). 
 
e Japanese are not the only ones who believe that their development experience and that of East 
Asia are valuable for Africa. Some Africans leaders, like the late Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi 
(who invited the introduction of kaizen), agree that the Japanese experience ought to be emulated in 
Africa. 
PROSAVANA: A BRIEF PRESENTATION.
As aforementioned, the development experience of Brazil’s cerrado, based on a 30-year cooperation 
programme with Japan known as Prodecer (1979-2001), inspired ProSavana. Prodecer’s promoters 
(viz. key Brazilian and Japanese actors like Embrapa, JICA, CAMPO, etc.) claim that it was 
responsible for transforming the Brazilian cerrado into one of the most productive regions in the 
country and a global producer of soybeans 2nd only to the United States. is was achieved with a 
“systems approach” such that the development of technologies, improvements to the soil, and the 
promotion of cooperatives and investment were all synergised (e Economist 2010). rough this 
collaborative programme Brazil gained from Japan important knowhow applicable to agricultural 
development in tropical savannah. Based on this fact, in 2009 Kenzo Oshima, then Senior Vice 
President of JICA, and Marco Farani, then Director of ABC, signed a Memorandum arming 
commitment to a “Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme for the Development of the African Tropical 
Savannah” to replicate the cerrado experience. e partnership to do so in Mozambique was initially 
cemented between then Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and then Brazilian President Lula da Silva 
at the L’Aquila G8 meeting in 2009, as part of the Global L’Aquila Food Security Initiative 
(ProSavana 2009).
ProSavana envisages development of commercial large-scale production systems alongside 
smallholder subsistence agriculture through cutting-edge technology, the Brazilian and Japanese 
experience, and conservational farming techniques. e ProSavana programme consists of three 
main components for supporting commercial- and subsistence-agriculture production systems 
(Embrapa 2012), namely: 1) ProSavana-PI, focussed on research and institutional capacity building; 
2) ProSavana-PD, the drawing-up of an agro-industrial development plan; and 3) ProSavana-PEM, 
the objective of which is to develop agricultural pilot-models for increasing agricultural production. 
e implementation of ProSavana started in 2011, and assumes a timeframe of at least 20 years. For 
operational purposes, its components have been turned into single projects, each having its own 
institutional arrangements and executive agencies, to be implemented in three phases. e rst 
component, concerning the improvement of research and extension capacities, technological 
adaptation, and developing Mozambique’s institutional capacity, will be executed by Embrapa, the 
Brazilian Agricultural Research Company in cooperation with the Mozambican Agrarian Research 
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Institute (IIAM) and the Japan International Research Centre on Agriculture (JIRCAS), a key 
Japanese institution in the management of Prodecer in Brazil’s cerrado. ProSavana-PI was the rst 
component to begin execution, with a timeframe of 5 years and a budget of US$13.4 million 
(ProSavana – Project I 2010). 
How has it fared so far? Its specic objectives were to: 1) improve the operational and dissemination 
technology in Nampula and Lichinga through forming human capital and the building of two 
laboratories;13 2) assess the socio-economic conditions and environmental impact of new 
technology; 3) identify the natural resource circumstances for agricultural practice in the Corridor 
and invent technology for sustainable use; 4) develop specic and practical technology solutions; 5) 
develop agricultural technology and validate it with local communities in selected demonstration 
units (Schlesinger 2014). 
e eld research performed in Mozambique for this article in 2012 and the later research on 
ProSavana show that the development of ProSavana-PI has been aected by conict between the 
Brazilian and Japanese teams owing to diculties on the Brazilian side in managing resources, 
dierences in approaches to cooperation and agricultural practices, and cultural and language 
distance (Fingermann 2014). e Brazilian legal framework in particular has been a limitation on 
the Brazilians’ capacity to answer their implementation needs; for example, only in December 2012 
was an ABC representative appointed (the rst of its kind in Africa) to Mozambique to facilitate the 
development of ProSavana. 
e second component consists in formulating a Master Plan (ProSavana-PD) that devises an 
integrated type of agro-industrial development. JICA, ABC and Mozambique’s Ministry of 
Agriculture (MINAG) coordinate this component, which has an estimated budget of US$7.7 
million (Fingermann 2014). e Master Plan has been entrusted to the Fundação Getúlio Vargas 
(FGV Projetos) in Brazil; Oriental Consulting and NTC International, two Japanese consulting 
companies; and MINAG. e Master Plan should include, according to its proponents: (i) proposals 
for agricultural development projects in the Corridor; (ii) proposals for management structures to 
support the Corridor’s development; and (iii) proposals for quick-impact pilot-projects (Chichava et 
al. 2013). Initially, ProSavana expected to deliver the Master Plan in 2013, but the critiques by 
various stakeholders, mainly civil society, have delayed the presentation of the nal version further 
after it was postponed to early 2015 (Wise 2014). 
e third component, ProSavana-PE, is to increase agricultural production levels in specic target 
areas through adoption of agricultural models. e main agencies involved in this are the 
Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture; JICA; Brazil’s Association of Technical Assistance and Rural 
Extension (ASBRAER); Brazil’s National Service for Rural Learning (SENAR); and Brazil’s Ministry 
of Rural Development (MDR). is component will run until 2019, and its budget is estimated at 
US$15 million (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013). 
13. e Brazilian counterpart is in charge of building Lichinga’s laboratory, and according to Fingermann (2014) the 
construction has not started yet and there is no exact date established for it to start. Nampula’s laboratory is in charge of the 
Japanese counterpart and the activities started in 2013. 
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ProSavana is being implemented within a 14 million hectare area in the Nacala Corridor,14 covering 
the Provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa, Tete and Zambezia (ProSavana 2013). It is 
expected that the project will directly support 400,000 small farmers and indirectly benet 3.6 
million agricultural workers (Embrapa 2012). According to Satoshi Murosawa, Director of JICA in 
Brazil, the organisation chose the Nacala Corridor because it “possesses similar geography, climate 
and soil (red earth) to the Brazilian cerrado region, and some consider that it looks like the north of 
Paraná” (Murosawa 2012). Taking into account ProSavana’s magnitude in terms of expected outputs 
and the size of the implementation zone, important socio-economic changes may occur across the 
region. Moreover, in addition to ProSavana’s components, a large increase in public and private 
investment in the Nacala Corridor is also expected, particularly in sectors like agricultural 
production and infrastructure, even though private investment is not directly linked-in as a 
component of the ProSavana programme.
Figure 1. ProSavana’s location in Mozambique
Source: JICA & ABC (2011)
JICA and Embrapa’s representatives in Mozambique conrmed the “win-win-win” logic of the 
ProSavana programme in several interviews conducted in July-December 2012. Indeed, the SSC 
logic of mutual benet is translated into triangular cooperation in the programme’s representation. 
ProSavana was initially discussed and agreed by Brazil and Japan, meaning the programme wasn’t 
born of a direct request of the Mozambican government, as Brazilian SSC principles presume. e 
14. e area is in the region between latitude 13°S and 17°S. 
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From the viewpoint of food security, Japan can nd business opportunities in the distribution and 
marketing industries. [ProSavana] oers advantages of decreasing obstacles to enter the African market 
by promoting partnerships between Brazil and Japanese players. (JETRO, August 21, 2012, quoted in 
Funada-Classen 2013) 
Mozambican government approved the programme and has conrmed that it corresponds to a 
Mozambican programme supported by Brazil and Japan, and is aligned with the Strategic 
Development Plan of the Agrarian Sector of 2011 (Macua 2014).15 Notwithstanding all this, the 
win-win-win logic and the alignment of ProSavana with ocial Mozambican priorities is 
disregarded by the Mozambican CSOs, for whom it lacks transparency precisely on the win-win-win 
features, especially as to the Brazilian and Japanese private interests. 
It must be stressed that ProSavana is not the only or even the rst engagement of Brazil and Japan 
together in Africa or in Mozambique. In this country alone, Japan and Brazil have cooperated on 
two previous projects, one for sustainable improvement of sanitation and water supply in Zambézia 
Province (2008-2010), and the other a human resources training project in the health sector 
(2009-2011). e two countries have also been working together in other African countries such as 
Angola and Madagascar on a triangular basis (JICA 2009). Moreover, Brazil considers Japan its 
oldest and main partner in TDC (Abreu 2013). 
For Brazil and Japan an important gain is the participation of private rms as foreign direct investors 
in the region, which the ProSavana programme facilitates. In fact, ProSavana-PD was accompanied 
by parallel initiatives to promote the programme and to nudge the private sector to consider the 
business opportunities occasioned by it. 
Various promotion activities have taken place in Brazil, Japan and Mozambique since the launch of 
ProSavana, to present it to the private sector, to other cooperation agencies, and to stakeholders. A 
seminar on “Agribusiness in Mozambique: Brazil-Japan International Cooperation and Investment 
Opportunities” was held in April 2011 in São Paulo to present ProSavana-JBM to its stakeholders: 
the Brazilian and Mozambican ministries of agriculture, ABC, USAID-Brazil, and JICA 
(Matutações 2012). at same month, the Mato Grosso Association of Cotton Producers (AMPA), 
the ABC, and Itamaraty organised another seminar in Cuiabá whose main aim, which beneted 
from the attendance of Mozambique’s Agriculture Minister, was to invite Mato Grosso cotton and 
soy producers to invest in ProSavana’s region (Ampa 2011). 
As noted above, business opportunities are also important on the Japanese side.  In April 2012 
Japanese and Brazilian public and private concerns participated in a joint mission to explore the 
potential for agricultural development in the Nacala Corridor (Macahub 2012). Japanese 
businessmen as well as representatives of JICA, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Foreign Aairs made up the delegation. According 
to Funada-Classen (2013), the Japanese media and ocial institutions like JICA covered the visit by 
highlighting the potential for business opportunities for the Japanese private sector; for example: 
15. PEDSA is its acronym in Portuguese.
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According to the Fundação Getúlio Vargas project coordinator, Brazilian farmers are keen to migrate 
to Mozambique because of the low cost of land there compared to Brazil; the incentives proposed by 
the Brazilian government within the framework of ProSavana and the Fundo Nacala (Nacala Fund); 
and the better location of Mozambique nearer Asian markets. Conceived by FGV Projetos, ABC, 
JICA, Embrapa, FAO, MINAG, Mozambique-Brazil Chamber of Commerce and 4I. GREEN,16 the 
Fundo Nacala was launched in 2012 to attract private investment and develop agribusiness in particular 
in the Nacala Corridor. With FGV Projetos and 4I. GREEN as managers, its promoters’ claim that 
the Fundo will reach US$2 billion in Brazil and Japan combined. Its objectives are to: (i) incentivise 
large-scale production systems through creation of Brazilian lead associations, whereby Brazilian 
farmers will work with Mozambicans to assure capacity transfer; and (ii) integrate small-holders into 
the value-chain, the mechanism of which has yet to be dened (FGV Projetos 2012).
For their part, MINAG and the Mozambican investment company Gapi17 launched the ProSavana 
Development Initiative Fund (PDIF) in September 2012 with the support of JICA. According to 
JICA, the objective is to enable private sector eorts to involve small-scale farmers through contract 
farming (JICA 2012). Its promoters claim the PDIF as well as the Nacala Fund are not directly 
linked to the ProSavana programme; nevertheless, both were developed under the ProSavana-PD 
framework. e total amount available initially is US$750,000, while US$500,000 is JICA’s 
participation and US$250,000 is GAPI-SI’s (FGV Projetos 2012). PDIF approved its rst credit 
package in 2012, which amounted to US$390,000 and benetted ve companies: Lozane Farms, 
Ikuru, Orwera Seed Company, Matharia Emprendimentos, and Santos Agrícola (Macahub 2012a). 
e rst Brazilian investments to be approved in northern Mozambique were Mozaperon 
Agropecuária and Araperon Agropecuária, both for cereal production in Niassa province, amounting 
to US$3,748,100 apiece. In September 2012 Agromoz announced its intention to produce soybeans 
in Gurue, Zambézia Province, with the participation of Grupo Pinesso from Brazil (Hanlon & 
Smart 2012), which is already well-established in Sudan growing soybeans and cotton (Ampa 2011). 
ere is no evidence that these investments are directly linked to or resultant from ProSavana. 
Given the heavy promotion of private-sector involvement, there can be little doubt of the leading 
role attributable to private investors in the implementation of the programme. e alignment of 
development strategies with foreign investment is not in itself the problem, but rather the lack of 
transparency about the private economic stakes in play, hidden behind the “solidarity”, 
“participatory”, “win-win-win” discourse of Brazil’s SSC. In consequence, Mozambican, Japanese 
and Brazilian CSOs alike have turned against ProSavana and now strongly oppose this triangular 
cooperation programme. is upshot reveals a new role for CSOs in the international development 
cooperation ecology. 
16. A Brazilian specialist’s consortium specialising in this kind of business.
17. GAPI-SI is a Mozambican institution that supports business development. 
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e project was inspired by an earlier agricultural development project implemented by the Brazilian 
and Japanese governments in the Brazilian Cerrado (savannah), where large-scale industrial farming of 
monocrops (mainly soybeans) is now practiced. is Brazilian project led to a degradation of the 
environment and the near extinction of indigenous communities living in the aected areas. e 
Nacala Corridor was chosen because its savannah has similar characteristics to the Brazilian Cerrado, 
in terms of its climate and agroecology, and because of the ease with which products can be exported 
… We, peasant farmers condemn the way in which the ProSavana programme was drafted and the way 
it is intended to be implemented in Mozambique, which has been characterised by reduced 
transparency and the exclusion of civil society organisations throughout the process, especially peasant 
organisations. (UNAC 2012)
ARE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS EXERTING A POLITICAL CHECK ON INTERNATION-AL 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?
Brazilian and Mozambican media have covered the seminars promoting ProSavana in both countries 
as proof of the business potential that is opened up by this triangular cooperation programme, each 
in their own way. Brazilian media have been touting that “Mozambique oers cheap land to 
Brazilians” (Terra 2011), and “Mozambique oers land to Brazilian soya” (Folha de São Paulo 2011). 
By contrast, Mozambican media accuse ProSavana of being “Brazilian neo-colonialism” and 
technical cooperation of being the “Trojan horse” of Brazilian economic interests in Africa (Folha de 
São Paulo 2011; Rafael 2011; Matutações 2012). 
Mozambican CSOs share these concerns about ProSavana, and have been raising concerns about its 
impact on Mozambican small farmers in the Nacala Corridor. e CSOs who are the most active 
include União Nacional dos Camponeses (UNAC), Justiça Ambiental (JA), Plataforma Provincial da 
Sociedade Civil de Nampula (PPOSC-N), and Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das 
Comunidades Rurais (ADECRU). UNAC, for example, has excoriated ProSavana in these terms:
 
e Mozambican NGO Justiça Ambiental describes the Brazilian model as a failure: “more than 65 
million Brazilians are in situation of food insecurity and millions of people struggle for access to land 
for food production as a means of ensuring livelihood” (JA4Change 2013). Even if Brazilian 
cooperation has a friendly dimension characterised by projects like Native Seeds Rescue, run by the 
Brazilian CSO Movimento Camponês Popular (MCP), where enhancing Mozambican farmers’ skills 
is a priority, for Mozambican civil society the main focus is still agro-business, such that the 
Mozambican farmers could end up as employees of Brazilian large-scale investors, promoted by SSC 
projects like ProSavana, and no strengthening or improvement of family farmers will actually 
happen. is position contrasts rather starkly with the Brazilian representation of it as a “success”.
Since 2012 UNAC has been put in touch by Via Campesina with Brazilian movements like Sem 
Terra and Japanese NGOs like No! To Land Grab, to discuss ProSavana and its eect on the 
Mozambican agricultural landscape (JA4Change 2013). Mozambican civil society’s concerns 
heightened and the biggest farmers’ organisation in Mozambique released its rst statement against 
ProSavana in October 2012 (UNAC 2012), which garnered worldwide attention. Following this 
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rst statement, twenty-three Mozambican CSOs published in 2013 an Open Letter to the 
Presidents / Prime Ministers of Mozambique, Japan and Brazil, in which they demanded suspension 
of the activities of ProSavana and proposed instead the establishment of dialogue channels with civil 
society. e letter was signed by the various Mozambican CSOs, but also by international civil 
society organisations (including CSOs from Brazil and Japan), and by various individuals, especially 
Japanese academics (UNAC et al. 2013). e main concerns raised by the CSOs were: 1) the lack of 
transparency and public democratic deliberation surrounding the genesis of ProSavana and its 
impact on rural folk in Mozambique, considering the magnitude of the programme; and 2) its focus 
on the entry of multinationals, which will subvert rural families’ self-determination (UNAC et al. 
2013).
e Open Letter was handed to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the fth TICAD in Japan. 
Following these events, in September 2013 Japanese civil society released the “Call for immediate 
suspension and fundamental revision”, a joint statement on ProSavana that denounced the drafting 
of the Master Plan, and the preparation of quick-impact projects and pilot projects funded by the 
ProSavana Development Initiative Fund, which were starting up without proper consultation with 
Mozambican civil society (AJF et al. 2013). 
On 2 June 2014, in what may be described as a climactic moment, the Mozambican CSOs launched 
the “No to ProSavana” national campaign, in which to UNAC, JA and ADECRU was joined the 
CSOs Fórum Mulher (FM), Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos Humanos (LDH), Associação de Apoio e 
Assistência Jurídica às Comunidades (AAAJC), Livaningo, ActionAid Moçambique, and Kulima. 
According to the CSOs, the campaign was an answer to the “silence” of Shinzo Abe to their Open 
Letter. A huge conference in Maputo followed the same year at which Mozambican, Japanese and 
Brazilian CSOs were represented as well as international CSOs and scholars. Participants denounced 
the detrimental impacts that have already begun to aect northern Mozambique populations. Ana 
Paula Taucale, Vice-President of UNAC, noted that in the Monapo District of Nampula Province 
alone, about 3000 hectares of land had been taken from local farmers to be given to agribusiness for 
the production of soybeans (Via Campesina 2014). 
e complaints addressed to the Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese governments reect dierent 
approaches, and take account of each government’s role in the implementation of ProSavana. e 
appeal to Mozambique President Guebuza reminded him of the importance of subsistence 
agriculture for Mozambican rural communities, and how the supervention of multinationals will 
inevitably dislocate small farmers (UNAC et al. 2013). Moreover, the critique addressed to 
Mozambique’s government and ruling party Frelimo highlighted the links between Mozambican 
elites and the foreign investors in the Nacala Corridor and all over the country (Ndhaneta 2012). It 
is now recognised that, although foreign rms grab the major land concessions and investment 
projects, domestic elites play a central role in facilitating the acquisition process, and denitely 
benet from it (Fairbairn 2011). 
e Open Letter demands from Brazil a promise to engage in cooperative relations with 
Mozambique on the basis of solidarity amongst peoples and that development cooperation shall not 
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Japan is responsible for: i) Expenditure of nancial, material and human resources for the development 
of logistics of Corridor of Nacala (ports, roads, railways) to export soya, maize, cotton production to 
Japan, in order to face the Niponic demand for animal protein and bre. ii) While Brazilian companies 
take control of productive component, including the fertiliser market, seeds and machinery, so the 
Japanese corporations are intended to take over the logistic market and the commercialisation. 
(ADECRU 2013)
ADECRU denounces and strongly rejects the dangerous and imperial agenda of visit of the Japanese 
Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and the Japanese foreign policy for Mozambique and Africa, masked in 
diplomatic maxim ‘enforce the consolidation of political and friendly relations between the two 
people, supposedly brothers’ and translated into programs like ProSavana and the New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition in Africa. (ADECRU 2014)
be misused as a device to facilitate land grabbing in Mozambique by Brazilian investors (UNAC et 
al. 2013). 
Finally, the Letter spotlights a change in Japanese cooperation policy toward Mozambique, from the 
promotion of development to the advancement of private interests and mega-project investments in 
agriculture, energy and infrastructure (UNAC et al. 2013). 
For the past two years we have witnessed changes in CSO complaints regarding the roles of the 
partner countries involved in ProSavana, particularly Japan and Brazil. e rst voices of criticism 
against ProSavana addressed Brazil’s perceived economic self-interestedness in bringing its 
agro-industries and farmers in to prot from Mozambique’s cheap land. Lately, criticism has been 
addressed to the Japanese engagement too, a point echoed by Japanese CSOs. For example, 
ADECRU, a Mozambican academic movement, stated:
In fact, the rst protests against ProSavana focussed on Brazil’s role, as the emergence of Brazil’s 
ambitions in Africa and in the international system were in vogue. In parallel to Brazil’s approach to 
Mozambique, the emergence of new development actors like Brazil, China and India in the 
international system and in Africa caused great debate amongst academic and international 
cooperation circles (Gabas et al. 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley 2012; Mawdsley 2012). In this 
context, Brazil’s engagement with ProSavana fed concerns about a lack of transparency regarding its 
economic and political ambitions in Africa and in Mozambique. By contrast, Japan’s role was not 
initially in the spotlight. is situation has changed, and today’s protest against ProSavana addresses 
the perceived agendas of both countries. 
It must be underlined that during his visit to Mozambique in 2014, the local CSOs harshly criticised 
the Japanese Prime Minister. One of the most prominent critiques came, again, from ADECRU:
e actions of the CSOs have been yielding some positive eects, leading the developers of the 
programme to make eorts to bring more transparency and inclusion of CSOs in the debates over 
ProSavana. e rst meeting organised by MINAG to present ProSavana and consult with CSOs 
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Governments involved in this (triangular) cooperation are making eorts and will continue to do so 
in order to accommodate and address the concerns expressed by the Mozambican civil society 
organisations, and [they will] also [continue] to dialogue with representatives of civil society 
organisations in Japan and in Brazil in order to ensure a transparent, inclusive and participatory 
environment for dialogue. In this perspective, we rearm that we remain open and available to 
dialogue with all stakeholders and interested parties in contributing to the building of the programme, 
as well as the future of agriculture in the country, always transparently (MINAG 2014). 
was held in Cuamba, a district of Niassa Province, in September 2013. According to MINAG, the 
idea was to present the Master Plan and receive comments and suggestions from the CSOs (MINAG 
2013). Equally, after CSOs presented their concerns at a 24 July 2014 Conference, MINAG was 
again forced to respond, as follows: 
Since then, the government regularly publishes information on ProSavana through a special e-page18 
about the programme and continues to hold meetings with the CSOs. Pamphlets in Portuguese and 
indigenous languages explaining ProSavana are also distributed to the local population by MINAG.
It is also important to mention that according to Amorim (2014) the nature of the Fundo Nacala, 
which as we said had the ambition to develop agribusiness in Nacala Corridor, was also changed and 
its implementation postponed since then. Pressure from Mozambican and Brazilian CSOs is among 
the reasons given to explain this evolution. According to Wise (2014), the critiques raised against 
ProSavana ended up contributing to a friendlier version of the programme whereby Brazilian 
farmers migrated, expecting 40,000 hectares ready for investment. (But according to a ProSavana 
ocer, no investor could expect that in the Nacala Corridor.) 
e CSO mobilisations are even more promising if we consider that ProSavana is not the only 
international programme critiqued by Mozambican CSOs. For example, the Chinese “Friendship” 
rice farm located in the Xai-Xai irrigation scheme in Gaza Province, nanced by investments from 
Wanbao Africa Agriculture Development, Ltd. (WAADL) has been harshly criticised because of 
allegations that local farmers were expelled from their land (UNAC 2013; e Ecologist 2013). 
Another hotly contested project is the extraction of coal by the Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce 
in Tete Province, where the resettlement of local communities has been strongly condemned by the 
CSOs.  Equally, academic and CSO circles have sparked important debates about the 
implementation of infrastructural mega-projects in Mozambique and their impacts on local 
communities; for example, in April 2014 the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), the Instituto de 
Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) and the Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR) organised a 
“Conference on Mega-Projects: Policy and Governance”, where civil society representatives 
discussed national policy on mega-projects, particularly in the extraction sector. 
e Mozambican CSOs’ contestation of ProSavana and of Brazil’s and Japan’s foreign development 
policy in Mozambique occurs in the context of the increased diversication of actors participating 
18. www.prosavana.gov.mz/index.php 
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19. ese emerging actors not only reect the shifts of power balances among countries, but also the prominence of 
non-governmental actors like private sector, philanthropic foundations, civil society, etc. 
in development cooperation. New issues and actors19  are emerging on the global agenda, triggering 
transformations in the international development cooperation system; for example, civil society has 
won participation space at aid eectiveness summits, and participated in the Busan Partnership for 
Eective Development negotiation in 2011 that had strong input from developing countries and 
from civil society. What stood out in the Busan process is that CSOs of the Global South demanded 
accountability from donors and governments, and were searching for ways to proactively participate 
in the shaping of the international development cooperation system (Hayman 2012).
e overriding concern expressed by Mozambican CSOs about agriculture development 
mega-projects like ProSavana which combine international development cooperation with foreign 
direct investment by private interests, lies in their single-minded pursuit of elite self-interest and the 
risk that local communities will end up dispossessed of their own land, serving foreign capital and a 
consolidated local elite. What is dierent about the critiques addressed to ProSavana is that they are 
directed specically at Brazil’s and Japan’s foreign policy and development cooperation strategies in 
Mozambique. Moreover, one peculiarity of the anti-ProSavana activism of Mozambican CSOs is the 
number of international CSOs, not only those of Japan and Brazil. Support from Brazilian and 
Japanese CSOs as well as the visibility of the critiques addressed to ProSavana through international 
platforms like GRAIN or Via Campesina has helped arm the Mozambican CSOs’ claims. 
Before presenting the concluding remarks, it is important to recall that during the pre- and 
post-Independence periods in Mozambique’s history, civil society’s capacity to exercise its rights has 
been often in doubt. In fact, after Independence, the single party system did not allow the conditions 
necessary for the emergence of civil society associations, and it was not until a multiparty system was 
established in the 1990s that civil society organisations emerged. CSOs’ current situation is far better 
nowadays than at the end of the civil war in 1992. Important obstacles remain, however, despite 
important progress. Some diculties encountered by Mozambican CSOs are the constrained 
political “space”, a product of the ruling party’s rm control of political life; the lack of resources and 
capacities; and the fragmentation of civil society and lack of coordination amongst CSOs (Pereira 
2011; FDC 2007). at said, the support of international CSOs, mainly Japanese and Brazilian, for 
initiatives led by UNAC, JA or ADECRU has been a key factor in generating better visibility for the 
activities of Mozambican civil society. 
Table 4. List of CSOs actions against ProSavana
Activity Objective Participants Date
Joint Statement – Leaked copy of 
the Master Plan for the ProSavana 
programme in northern 
Mozambique conrms the worst
e leaked copy is dated March 
2013, and according to the CSO 
Statement, it makes clear how the 
governments of Japan, Brazil and 
Mozambique are “paving the way
- Justiça Ambiental (JA) 
(Mozambique)
- Forum Mulher (Mozambique)
- Friends of the Earth 
(Mozambique)
29/04/2014
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 2. 2016.
23
for a massive land grab”. According 
to the Statement, the Master Plan 
seeks to: 
1. Push farmers away from 
traditional cultivation toward 
intensive cultivation practices based 
on proprietary seeds and chemical 
inputs; 
2. Push farmers into contract 
farming arrangements with 
corporate rms; 
3. Prioritise the opportunities of 
private companies to prot from 
the Nacala Fund; 
4. Bring about the end of peasant 
agriculture. 
- Association for Rural Advancement
- Comunidades Ecologistas de la Ceiba
- Livaningo 
is statement was signed by 23 
CSOs and social movements from 
South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Honduras, Spain, Zambia, 
Denmark and Mozambique.   
Open Letter from Mozambican 
Civil Society Organisations and 
Movements
Letter addressed to the Presidents of 
Brazil and Mozambique and the 
Prime Minister of Japan to suspend 
ProSavana activities.
More than 23 Mozambican CSOs 
and 43 International organisations.
28/05/2013
Japanese civil society statement on 
ProSavana
Addressed to Japan’s Ministry of 
Foreign Aairs and JICA, calling 
for the immediate suspension and 
fundamental review of ProSavana.
- ATTAC Japan
- Citizens Concerned with the 
Development of Mozambique
- Africa-Japan Forum
- Japan International Volunteer 
  Center (JVC)
- Oxfam Japan
30/009/2013
Fifth General Assembly of 
ADECRU 
e Political Letter from 
ADECRU’s General Assembly 
manifests the disaection with the 
encroachment of agribusiness in the 
country through mega-projects like 
ProSavana. 
ADECRU 20/12/ 2013
ADECRU’s Position on the visit of 
the Prime Minister of Japan to 
Mozambique
ADECRU warns of “the dangerous 
Japanese policy and presence in 
Mozambique”, and protests against 
the New Alliance for Food and 
Nutrition and the ProSavana 
programme. 
ADECRU 9/01/2014
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Press release – the Platform of 
Nampula Civil Society 
(PPOSC-N)
Press release relating to the visit of 
M. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of 
Japan, where PPOSC object that 
the support of the Japanese 
government reects the logic of 
colonialism and protects the 
interests of international capital. 
UNAC - Nampula 13/01/2013
UNAC’s General Assembly One of the central discussion topics 
was the emergence of land conicts 
and land grabbing in Mozambique. 
Mechanisms of resistance to 
ProSavana were also discussed.
UNAC 29/04/2014
to 1/05/2014
e Nampula Declaration - 
UNAC 2014 Ordinary General 
Assembly 
Peasant leaders from Mozambique 
conrmed their position against 
ProSavana. A resistance agenda was 
settled on: 
1. UNAC will no longer tolerate 
ProSavana and promises to sue in 
court the Mozambican and foreign 
citizens involved in it.
UNAC 1/05/2014
Joint Mobilisation “Não 
ProSavana”
Launch of the national campaign 
NÃO AO PROSAVANA (“No to 
ProSavana”).
- Forum Mulher
- UNAC
- Justiça Ambiental (JA)
- Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos 
  Humanos (LDH)
- ADECRU
- Associacão de Apoio e Assistência 
  Jurídica às Comunidades (AAAJC)
- Livaningo
- ActionAid Moçambique
- Kulima
02/06/2014
Second Triangular Conference of 
the People of Mozambique, Japan 
and Brazil
Debate surrounding the ProSavana 
programme and the development 
priorities of Mozambique. 
- Forum Mulher
- UNAC
- Justiça Ambiental (JA)
- Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos 
  Humanos (LDH)
- ADECRU
- Associacão de Apoio e Assistência 
  Jurídica às Comunidades (AAAJC)
- Livaningo
- ActionAid Moçambique
- Kulima
24/07/2014
Source: Compilation by the author based on the press release, journals information and CSO websites.
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CONCLUSION.
is working paper has discussed how and why Mozambican civil society have been so critical of the 
Japanese-Brazilian-Mozambican ProSavana programme. Mozambican CSOs have contested the 
programme basically through open letters and the organisation of public seminars or debates, with 
the participation of international CSOs, particularly from Japan and Brazil. Given that the 
programme is still in its infancy, so that nothing concrete, either laudatory or pejorative, can yet be 
said about the impacts of the programme, critiques have essentially had to be based on the negative 
impacts of the Brazilian cerrado experience, in particular the marginalisation of small farmers in 
favour of big capital and the deleterious eects on the environment. However, the Mozambicans 
don’t explicitly cite to the cerrado experience. ey probably don’t know much about it, and likely 
care less. Usually, it is only academics who invoke the cerrado experience in their discourses. It is 
mainly the Brazilian partners who have transmitted the lessons from this experience to Mozambican 
civil society. 
e advent of massive investment in Mozambique by the “rising powers” of the global South, 
particularly Brazil and China, has caught the attentions of local civil society, which has become 
activist in scrutinising the impacts of these investments, especially as relates to agriculture and 
mining, which typically include the forcible eviction and resettlement of local populations. What is 
criticised is not investment itself, but what is considered a lack of transparency and of involvement 
by locals in discussions over project implementation. Civil society is also concerned over the huge 
expanses of land demanded by these projects. eir contestation of donors’ activities is beginning to 
produce positive results with policy makers, who are becoming more willing to involve CSOs in 
some consultations concerning ProSavana. e contestation has also forced the three governments’ 
partners to react, to give explanations, and to answer civil society complaints about the 
implementation and impacts of the programme. Last but not least, it is important to note that 
ProSavana is more a result of Brazil’s and Japan’s shared experience in TDC than Mozambican local 
demand, and represents a signal example of how this kind of partnership works in reality, beyond the 
transposition of SSC principles and narratives to TDC.  Note that the practice of “exporting agrarian 
practices to Africa” continues a legacy of failed colonial eorts and pre-supposes that Africans can’t 
develop by themselves, and that they can’t do agriculture on their own.
e broader logic behind ProSavana, additional to the technical terms, is that Mozambique needs to 
boost its agricultural sector, and Brazil and Japan need to promote and safeguard their big 
companies’ foreign investments. In this context, Mozambique is a good place to pursue these ends, 
having fertile and available land comparable to the Brazilian cerrado. Even so, we cannot compare 
today’s Mozambique to Brazil’s socio-political situation in the 1970s, when it lay under military 
dictatorship such that civil society could not possibly have followed up developments in the cerrado. 
is is quite contrary to the situation we witness in Mozambique today, where local CSOs engage in 
important debates over mega-projects in agriculture, infrastructure building, and extraction 
industries, with international visibility. In this sense, CSOs’ involvement in and monitoring of the 
ProSavana programme as well as other mega-projects, and their reections on the impacts of these 
for the inclusive and sustainable development of local communities, remain essential to a balanced 
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development strategy for Mozambique. As this chapter attests, the ProSavana programme will 
continue to face criticism and will have to accommodate at least some of Mozambican civil society’s 
demands.
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